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Effects of dividing attention on memory for declarative and procedural aspects of tool use
by Roy, S., and Park, N. W. (2016). Mem. Cogn. 44, 727–739. doi: 10.3758/s13421-016-0600-4
INTRODUCTION
Roy and Park (2016) developed the thesis that human tool use is based on a cooperative interaction
of declarative and procedural memory systems (Roy and Park, 2010; Roy et al., 2015). This thesis is
at odds with recent theoretical and empirical advances. Here, we discuss the validity of this thesis,
suggesting that the declarative vs. procedural memory distinction is not suited for understanding
the cognitive specificity of human tool use, namely, the ability to reason about physical object
properties (Osiurak, 2014).
PEOPLE REASON TO USE TOOLS
When we use a physical tool, such as a knife or a hammer, we have to manipulate it in order
to perform the intended mechanical action. For more than a century, scientists have placed a
great emphasis on the manipulative/gestural aspect, leading them to posit that human tool use is
supported by the ability to store sensorimotor knowledge about how tomanipulate tools, also called
manipulation knowledge (Geschwind, 1975; Heilman et al., 1982; Rothi et al., 1991; Buxbaum, 2001;
Binkofski and Buxbaum, 2013; Bach et al., 2014; van Elk et al., 2014). The manipulation-based
approach has been challenged in recent years. Particularly, evidence from left brain-damaged
patients has indicated a strong relationship between familiar tool use (using a hammer with a nail)
and mechanical problem solving (using a novel tool to extract a target out from a box; e.g., Heilman
et al., 1997; Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998; Hartmann et al., 2005; Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009;
Osiurak et al., 2009, 2013; Jarry et al., 2013, 2015; for reviews, Baumard et al., 2014; Osiurak and
Badets, 2016). Manipulation knowledge cannot be helpful to solve mechanical problem-solving
tasks, because the tools are novel and, therefore, are not associated with any specific gesture.
Moreover, the difficulty of the task mainly lies in the selection of the appropriate tools to perform
the intended mechanical actions.
Based on these findings, an alternative approach (the reasoning-based approach) has been
developed, assuming that human tool use mainly involves the ability to reason about the physical
object properties, also called technical reasoning (Osiurak et al., 2010, 2011; Goldenberg, 2014;
Orban and Caruana, 2014; Osiurak and Lesourd, 2014; Osiurak and Badets, 2016). These reasoning
skills are based on mechanical knowledge, namely, abstract physical principles learnt from
Osiurak et al. Tool Use and Declarative/Procedural Memory
experience (cutting, percussion). Mechanical knowledge is not
supposed to be gesture-centered or “sensorimotor” as suggested
by Roy et al. (2015) and Roy and Park (2010), but to
contain information about the physical relationships necessary
to perform a given mechanical action. For instance, understand
the cutting action amounts to understanding that it is the
relative opposition between one thing possessing the properties
Abrasiveness+ and Hardness+ vs. another thing possessing
the properties Abrasiveness− and Hardness−. So, when this
knowledge is impaired, it becomes difficult to select the familiar
tool (knife) appropriate to cut a tomato, or the novel tool suited
to extract a target out from a box. In broad terms, this knowledge
is involved in any tool use situations, both familiar and novel
ones.
TECHNICAL REASONING IS NEITHER
DECLARATIVE, NOR PROCEDURAL
Mechanical knowledge is not supposed to be declarative. Most
people can select a knife with a sharpened edge to cut a tomato
without being able to explain explicitly the cutting action. Infants
as young as 4.5 months of age understand that objects cannot
remain stable without support (Baillargeon et al., 1992). Yet, they
are unable to explain the principle of support, namely, an object
resting on a support is stable only if a perpendicular line drawn
through the object center of gravity falls within the support’s
boundaries (Baillargeon et al., 1992). Even though most adults
are also unaware of this principle, they use it systematically in
everyday life.
In addition, as discussed, technical reasoning is not based
on sensorimotor processes. So, at a theoretical level, it appears
inconsistent with the idea that this kind of reasoning is
procedural. Neuroanatomical evidence also speaks against this
possibility. Particularly, both familiar tool use and mechanical
problem solving are impaired after damage to the left inferior
parietal cortex (Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998; Goldenberg
and Spatt, 2009). Recently, we conducted a meta-analysis on
neuroimaging data from studies focusing on tool use (Reynaud
et al., 2016). We found that the cytoarchitectonic area PF
within the left inferior parietal cortex is strongly activated
when participants have to reason about the appropriateness
of mechanical actions, irrespective of whether tools and
objects are familiar or novel. By contrast, procedural memory
relies on a fronto-striatal network (Squire, 2009). It has also
been shown that patients with Parkinson’s disease, known to
have procedural memory deficits, perform relatively well on
everyday activities involving the use of tools, notwithstanding
some difficulties in the execution per se (Giovannetti et al.,
2012).1
1As explained above, the manipulation-based approach is an alternative to the
manipulation-based approach according to which sensorimotor knowledge about
manipulation (i.e., manipulation knowledge) is critical to tool use (see Buxbaum,
2001; Johnson-Frey, 2004; Martin, 2007). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that even
In sum, a core feature of human tool use may lie in
technical reasoning skills involving the left inferior parietal
cortex. This aspect was largely ignored or misunderstood in
the articles published by Roy and Park—“mechanical problem-
solving... draws on general sensorimotor knowledge” (Roy and
Park, 2010; p. 3028). Instead, they assumed that tool use
is supported by declarative (temporal cortex) and procedural
(fronto-striatal network) aspects of memory, suggesting that this
framework could be suited to explain how people are able to
use complex tools, such as a “razor,” a “spatula,” or “scissors”
(Roy and Park, 2016; p. 727). However, as stressed above, severe
difficulties to use this kind of tools appropriately do not occur
after damage to the frontal cortex or basal ganglia (procedural
memory), or to the temporal cortex (declarative memory),
but after damage to the left inferior parietal cortex (technical
reasoning).
CONCLUSION
The research developed by Roy, Park and colleagues suggests
that tool-use paradigms might be useful to understand
how declarative and procedural memory systems work.
However, the main weakness is to consider that tool use
is mainly based on declarative and procedural aspects. As
explained, the core aspect of human tool use may be technical
reasoning skills. Unfortunately, this aspect is largely ignored
in the theoretical framework developed by Roy, Park, and
colleagues.
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1for proponents of the manipulation-based approach, manipulation knowledge is
not a synonym of procedural memory, for at least two reasons. First, manipulation
knowledge is thought to store information about the features of gestures that are
needed to manipulate tools skillfully. By contrast, procedural memory is involved
in the incremental learning of motor skills. Second, manipulation knowledge relies
on the left inferior parietal cortex, whereas a fronto-striatal network supports
procedural memory. In broad terms, the declarative vs. procedural memory
distinction proposed by Roy and Park (2016) (see also Roy and Park, 2010; Roy
et al., 2015) is also theoretically inconsistent with the widespread, manipulation-
based approach.
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